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 QUANTIFYING FORESEEABILITY 
OREN BAR-GILL* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article extends the law-and-economics literature on the fore-
seeability doctrine and on contract default rules more generally. It de-
rives (numerically) the optimal default cap on contractual damages in 
a model with a continuum of buyer types and perfect competition 
among sellers. When communication costs are low, the optimal cap is 
significantly higher than the damages incurred by the average buyer. 
A better performance technology reduces the optimal damages cap. 
Greater homogeneity among buyers increases the optimal cap. The Ar-
ticle identifies conditions under which an optimally defined foresee-
ability threshold significantly increases welfare. It also explores the 
normative implications of the doctrinal preclusion of a zero-damages 
default. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Contract law limits recovery for breach of contract. In particular, 
harm deemed extraordinary or excessively remote is excluded from 
the damages measure under the foreseeability doctrine.1 Limited re-
covery is not, however, an immutable tenet of contract law. It is a de-
fault rule. A contracting party can render an extraordinary harm re-
coverable simply by informing the other party that such harm is pos-
sible in the present case. The foreseeability doctrine in effect speci-
fies a threshold level of harm. Harm below the threshold, ordinary 
harm, is always recoverable. Harm above the threshold is recover-
able only if it is communicated to the other party at the time of con-
tracting. What is the optimal threshold? What harm should be recov-
erable by default, and when should specific communication be re-
quired?  
 The foreseeability doctrine has served in the law-and-economics 
literature as the primary example for studying the optimal design of 
default rules.2 I too hope that the analysis developed in this Article 
will be modestly informative for general default rule theory. I do not, 
however, develop these broader implications here. Rather, I focus 
solely on foreseeability doctrine. My goal is to derive the optimal de-
fault cap on contract damages and to explore the relationship be-
tween this theoretical optimum and the judicial elucidation of the 
foreseeability doctrine. 
 The analysis is motivated by the recognition that damages for 
breach of contract lie on a continuum—from the obvious harm that 
would always follow a breach of the type of contract considered to the 
most remote and extraordinary harm that would occur in only a very 
small percentage of cases. It is this continuum that foreseeability 
doctrine divides—into recoverable and nonrecoverable damages—by 
setting a cap, a threshold level of damages. The question I ask is thus 
somewhat different from the standard question in this literature. 
Most previous accounts assume two discrete levels of damages—low 
damages and high damages—and ask whether the default rule 
should allow recovery for only low damages (limited liability), or for 
both low and high damages (unlimited liability). Rather than asking 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See U.C.C. § 2-715 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). 
 2. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & 
Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and 
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency]; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information 
and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic 
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); George S. Geis, Empirically 
Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 897 (2005). 
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whether liability for breach of contract should be limited or unlim-
ited, I ask where on the continuum of damages levels the limit 
should be placed.3 
 The first step in the analysis is to derive the equilibrium behavior 
of the contracting parties. There are two alternative equilibria identi-
fied by the number of regions into which the group of buyers is di-
vided. In the first, four-region equilibrium, buyers divide into four 
groups: (1) buyers with low valuations (and correspondingly low 
damages) who choose not to contract because they do not want to pay 
the high pooling price and they do not find it worthwhile to expend 
communication costs in order to attain a lower price, (2) buyers with 
higher valuations who separate themselves in order to pay a lower 
price, (3) buyers with intermediate valuations who save on communi-
cation costs and pay the pooling price, and (4) buyers with high 
valuations who are willing to pay a higher price to guarantee their 
expectation interest. In the second, three-region equilibrium, buyers 
divide into only three groups: (1) buyers with low valuations who 
choose not to contract, (2) buyers with intermediate valuations who 
save on communication costs and pay the pooling price, and (3) buy-
ers with high valuations who are willing to pay a higher price to 
guarantee their expectation interest. 
 The size of the different groups in both equilibria depends on the 
damages cap. What is the optimal cap? In the standard two-type 
model, the optimal rule—that is, the optimal choice between limited 
and unlimited liability—induces the right type of equilibrium (pool-
ing or separating) and, if separation is efficient, guarantees that this 
separation is attained with minimum communication costs.4 In the 
continuous-type model, characterizing the optimal rule is more com-
plicated. First, as mentioned above, the choice is no longer binary—
limited versus unlimited liability; rather the optimal cap can be 
anywhere on the continuum of possible damages levels. Second, the 
pooling versus separating question is no longer a binary question. 
There are different degrees of pooling and separating.  
                                                                                                                      
 3. Bebchuk and Shavell briefly consider a continuous-type extension to their two-
type model. See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 2, at 308. Johnston studies a continuous-
type model but considers only two possible rules: an unlimited liability rule and a limited 
liability rule with liability capped at the average level of damages. See Johnston, supra 
note 2, at 626-27, 651.  Moreover, Johnston assumes that sellers have market power, while 
I assume perfect competition among sellers. See id. at 636-37. Geis uses a continuous-type 
model but assumes discrete care levels (and, correspondingly, discrete probabilities of per-
formance) and considers only an unlimited liability rule and a limited liability rule defined 
by a fixed damages cap. See Geis, supra note 2. Adler studies a two-type model but charac-
terizes each buyer type by a stochastic continuous distribution of damages. See Adler, su-
pra note 2, at 1561. 
 4. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 2. 
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 Finally, the continuous-type model reveals an efficiency consid-
eration that the two-type models, at least those assuming perfect 
competition, do not emphasize: a potentially significant group of buy-
ers might be driven out of the market. It is well recognized that a 
seller with market power may choose not to serve the low end of the 
market.5 The continuous-type model shows that low-valuation buyers 
might leave the market even with perfect competition among sellers. 
And this inefficiency must also be considered in setting the optimal 
damages cap.6 
 The optimal damages cap achieves the right balance of pooling 
and separation, minimizes communication costs, and optimally con-
trols the entry and exit of low-valuation buyers. I develop a numeric 
algorithm that solves for the optimal cap and study how different pa-
rameters, specifically the magnitude of communication costs, the per-
formance technology, and the distribution of buyer valuations, affect 
the optimal cap. 
 The analysis yields the following results. When communication 
costs are low, as is arguably the case in most contracting environ-
ments, the optimal damages cap is significantly above the average 
buyer valuation.7 In fact, for a broad range of parameter values the 
optimal cap is above the eightieth percentile of buyer valuations. The 
optimal damages cap is lower when communication costs are larger, 
but even when communication costs are very large, the optimal fore-
seeability threshold significantly exceeds the average buyer valua-
tion. This result supports the modern tendency to narrowly apply the 
foreseeability requirement.8  
 The performance technology, and specifically the cost-
effectiveness of reducing the probability of breach, also has a signifi-
cant effect on the optimal damages cap. Focusing on the more com-
mon, low communication costs environments, a superior performance 
technology requires a lower foreseeability threshold—a counterintui-
tive result. It is noteworthy that even this lower cap is significantly 
above the average buyer valuation. The remaining parameter is the 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 2, at 744, 747. 
 6. Barry Adler notes that marginal buyers might be driven out of the market. Adler, 
supra note 2, at 1556 n.25. Adler, however, blames this result on the high pooling price 
that results under expansive liability. Id. at 1556-57.  As I argue below, low-valuation buy-
ers might leave the market because they do not find it worthwhile to secure a low price by 
communicating their type. 
 7. When communication costs are zero, full separation will obtain: every buyer will 
reveal her type and sellers will tailor the probability of breach and the price to every spe-
cific buyer. Clearly the legal default is of no importance when communication costs are 
zero. But communication costs are never zero. How small must communication costs be to 
render the search for the optimal default meaningless? I take up this question below. 
 8. See, e.g., 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 259 
(3d ed. 2004) (“The modern trend is . . . toward narrowing the limitation imposed by Had-
ley v. Baxendale by phrasing the test in terms of ‘foreseeability.’ ”). 
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distribution of buyer valuations. The numeric analysis suggests that 
a higher foreseeability threshold should be set when the distribution 
of buyer valuations is more homogeneous. The implications of asym-
metric/skewed distributions of buyer valuations are also briefly ex-
plored. 
 How important is it to optimally set the foreseeability threshold? 
How much welfare will be lost if the wrong default is chosen? Not 
surprisingly, if communication costs are sufficiently small, the legal 
default matters very little. The analytical framework developed in 
this Article can tell us how small is sufficiently small. For example, if 
losing 1% of the maximum attainable welfare is considered to be in-
sufficiently important in a given context, then as long as communica-
tion costs do not exceed 2% of the average buyer valuation, even sig-
nificant deviations from the optimal default should not raise concern. 
 The optimal foreseeability threshold described above is in some 
cases only a second-best optimum. The optimization problem that 
produced this threshold was solved under the constraint that dam-
ages cannot be capped too close to zero. The numeric algorithm thus 
ruled out a zero- (or close to zero) damages default, even when such a 
default produced the highest welfare. This doctrinal-institutional 
constraint reflects the view that courts would resist a regime of no li-
ability for breach of contract, even if this is only a default regime.9 
 What are the welfare implications of the doctrinal constraint? 
When communication costs are high, the constraint is not binding. In 
most real-world environments, however, where communication costs 
are low, the doctrinal constraint is binding. Moreover, the welfare 
loss incurred by ruling out a zero-damages default can be quite sig-
nificant—up to 10% of the maximum attainable welfare for some pa-
rameter values. These adverse welfare implications merit a reconsid-
eration of the doctrine behind the doctrinal constraint. While a broad 
“no damages” default seems institutionally untenable, zero-damages 
defaults for specific categories of damages, for example, lost retail 
profits or consequential damages more generally, does not seem un-
thinkable.10 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Robert Scott and George Triantis, while developing a powerful case against the 
compensation principle in contract law, recognize that “[t]he dominance of the compensa-
tion principle is now unquestioned.” Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Op-
tions and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1446 
(2004). 
 10. In fact, Ian Ayres has argued that lost retail profits should be governed by a zero-
damages default. See Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 
891-92 (2003). More generally, since the foreseeability limitation applies only to conse-
quential damages, see, e.g., 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 12.14, at 256-57, strengthening 
this limitation by setting a zero-damages default would not lead to the doctrinally prob-
lematic result that breach of contract entails no remedy unless the parties specify a rem-
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 The analysis in this Article builds upon and extends previous 
work on the foreseeability doctrine. This line of research suffers from 
an important limitation. The theoretical results and specifically the 
optimal damages cap depend on parameter values that are difficult 
to ascertain empirically.11 The practical value of this line of research 
depends on the ability to import—from other social sciences—and 
utilize more sophisticated empirical tools.12 It is important to empha-
size that the empirical assessments required to operationalize the 
theoretical results need not be absolutely accurate. The analysis in 
this Article suggests that even rough estimates of the underlying pa-
rameters can lead to a better calibration of the foreseeability thresh-
old and thus to greater welfare.  
 From a policy perspective the parameter that is most important to 
evaluate empirically is the magnitude of communication costs. The 
model developed in this Article can tell us how large communication 
costs must be for the default rule to matter. But only empirical re-
search can identify the contractual environments where communica-
tion costs are sufficiently large to justify an effort to optimally set the 
default. 
 The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II devel-
ops the continuous-type model. Part III reports the results of the 
numeric analysis: how the optimal damages cap depends on the un-
derlying parameters. Part IV identifies conditions under which an 
optimally defined foreseeability threshold can significantly increase 
welfare. Part V explores the normative implications of the doctrinal 
constraint that precludes a zero-damages default. Part VI discusses 
extensions. Part VII concludes. 
II.   MODEL 
A.   Framework of Analysis 
 A seller operating in a perfectly competitive market faces a buyer 
whose valuation of the offered product or service is unknown to the 
seller. Let v denote the value of the product or service—the value of 
contractual performance—to the buyer. This value, v, is the buyer’s 
type. The seller knows only the distribution of buyer valuations, f(v). 
The support of f(v) is normalized to [0,1] without loss of generality. 
For any specific buyer, the value of performance is private informa-
                                                                                                                      
edy. The difficulty, of course, is that the distinction between regular and consequential 
damages is not always easy to draw. 
 11. See Adler, supra note 2; Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003). 
 12. Recent work by George Geis demonstrates how sophisticated empirical method-
ologies can be used to operationalize theoretical contract law models. See Geis, supra note 2. 
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tion, but the buyer can communicate her valuation to the seller at a 
cost, k. 
 The probability of successful performance is given by p(x), where x 
represents the seller’s precautions (in monetary terms). I assume 
that p′(x) > 0 and p′′(x) < 0 (and, of course, p(x) ∈[0,1]). If the seller 
breaches the contract, he will pay damages, d. The damage measure 
can take one of two values: (1) the actual full expectation measure, v, 
or (2) the legally determined foreseeable harm damage measure, vˆ .13 
Let d(v) denote the damage measure applicable to buyer v. 
 The seller’s expected total cost when facing a subset of buyers 
[ ]vvv ,∈  is ( )[ ]∫ +⋅−= v
v
vv dvvfxvdxpxc )()()()( 1 .14 The seller will choose x 
to minimize his expected cost. The minimized cost, vvvv cxc ≡)( * , de-
fines the price charged by the seller. The profit of buyer v is ( ) vvcvdxpvxpv −⋅−+⋅= )()()()( 1π  (minus communication costs, k, 
when the buyer chooses to communicate her type to the seller). 
B. The Buyer’s Decision Whether to Disclose Her Type 
 There are two alternative equilibria in this model. In the first, 
four-region equilibrium buyers divide into four sub-groups: (1) buyers 
with low valuations, v ∈[0, v1], who choose not to contract because 
they do not want to pay the high pooling price and they do not find it 
worthwhile to expend k in order to attain a lower price, (2) buyers 
with higher valuations, v ∈[v1, v2], who separate themselves in order 
to pay a lower price, (3) buyers with intermediate valuations, v ∈[v2, 
v3], who save on communication costs and pay the pooling price, and 
(4) buyers with high valuations, v ∈[v3, 1], who are willing to pay a 
higher price to guarantee their expectation interest. In the second, 
three-region equilibrium, buyers divide into only three sub-groups: 
(1) buyers with low valuations, v ∈[0, v1], who choose not to contract, 
(2) buyers with intermediate valuations, v ∈[v2, v3], who save on 
communication costs and pay the pooling price, and (3) buyers with 
high valuations, v ∈[v3, 1], who are willing to pay a higher price to 
guarantee their expectation interest. 
1.   The Four-Region Equilibrium 
 The threshold value v1 can be found by solving 
(1) kcv
v
+=
11
. 
                                                                                                                      
 13. I abstract from the possibility of stipulated damages set at a level other than the 
full expectation measure. 
 14. In the special case where the seller knows the buyer’s valuation, his expected cost 
is (1 – p(x)) . d(v) + x. 
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The marginal buyer is indifferent between exiting the market and 
earning a zero payoff on the one hand, and communicating her type 
and earning her valuation minus the tailored price (and minus com-
munication costs) on the other hand. The threshold price is ( ) )())(( ** 1111 1 vxvvxpcv +⋅−= , where ( ) )())((minarg)(* 1111 1 vxvvxpvx +⋅−= .  
The threshold value 2v  satisfies 
 ( ) 322222 1 vvv cvxpvxpkcv −⋅−+⋅=−− )()( , or 
(2) 322 vvv ckc =+ . 
 The marginal buyer is indifferent between paying the tailored 
price plus communication costs on the one hand, and paying the 
higher pooling price on the other hand. Note that vv ˆ<2 . A buyer 
with ε−= vv ˆ2  would not expend k to get a marginally more favor-
able combination of price and care. The threshold price is ( ) )())(( ** 2222 1 vxvvxpcv +⋅−= ,where ( ) )())((minarg)(* 2222 1 vxvvxpvx +⋅−= . 
A seller facing a pool of buyers with ],[ 32 vvv∈  expects a total cost of 
[ ]( ) ( )[ ]∫ +⋅−⋅∈= 3232 11 32
v
vvv
dvvfxvdxp
vvv
xc )()()(
,Pr
)( , where 


>
≤=
vvv
vvv
vd
ˆ,ˆ
ˆ,
)( , or 
[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]  ∫ +⋅−+∫ +⋅−⋅∈=
3
232
111
32
v
v
v
v
vv
dvvfxvxpdvvfxvxp
vvv
xc
ˆ
ˆ
)(ˆ)()()(
,Pr
)( . 
 The pooling level of precaution is )(minarg xcx vvvv 3232 = , and the 
pooling price is )( 323232 vvvvvv xcc ≡ . The threshold value 3v  satisfies 
( ) kcvcvxpvxp vvv −−=−⋅−+⋅ 33323 1 ˆ)()( , or 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) kccvvxp vvv +−=−⋅− 32331 ˆ)( . 
The marginal buyer is indifferent between paying the pooling price and 
getting only the legally determined damages measure in case of breach 
on the one hand, and paying the higher tailored price plus communica-
tion costs to guarantee her expectation interest on the other. Note that 
vv ˆ>3 . A buyer with ε+= vv ˆ3  would not expend k to get a marginally 
more favorable combination of price and care. The threshold price is ( ) )())(( ** 33313 vxvvxpcv +⋅−= , where ( ) )())((minarg)(* 3333 1 vxvvxpvx +⋅−= . 
Using equations (1) through (3), I can solve for the threshold values, 1v , 
2v  and 3v , as a function of the legally determined damages cap, vˆ . The 
four-region equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 
THE FOUR-REGION EQUILIBRIUM 
 
2.   The Three-Region Equilibrium 
 The threshold value 2v  satisfies ( ) 3222 10 vvcvxpvxp −⋅−+⋅= )()( , or  
(4) 322 vvcv = . 
The marginal buyer is indifferent between exiting the market and 
earning a zero payoff on the one hand, and paying the pooling price 
on the other hand. The threshold value 3v  is derived from equation 
(3), as in the four-region equilibrium.  
 Using equations (3) and (4), I can solve for the threshold values, 
2v and 3v , as a function of the legally determined damages cap, vˆ . 
The three-region equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
THE THREE-REGION EQUILIBRIUM 
 
C.   The Welfare Maximizing Rule 
 For any legally determined damages cap, vˆ , there is a unique vec-
tor of threshold values—( 1v , 2v , 3v ) in the four-region equilibrium, 
and ( 2v , 3v ) in the three-region equilibrium—that defines the sub-
groups of buyers and implicitly the price, vvc , paid by each buyer and 
the profit, )(vπ , enjoyed by each buyer. Social welfare is given by 
dvvfvvW )()()ˆ( ∫=
1
0
π . The optimal vˆ  solves )ˆ(max
ˆ
vW
v
. 
D.   Numeric Analysis 
 The continuous-type model developed above is more realistic than 
the standard two-type model. The cost of realism, however, is com-
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plexity. Solving the continuous-type model analytically is beyond this 
author’s capabilities. I therefore resort to numeric analysis, solving 
the model (or, more precisely, asking a computer to solve the model) 
for different parameter values.15 
 First and foremost, I study the effects of communication costs by 
varying the magnitude of the parameter k. Second, I study the impli-
cations of different performance technologies. I use the probability of 
performance function xexp λ−−= 1)( , where the λ  parameter repre-
sents the performance technology, specifically the efficacy of precau-
tion expenditures in reducing the probability of breach.  
 Finally, I study the role of the distribution of buyer valuations. 
The distribution of buyer valuations is assumed to follow a Beta dis-
tribution. The Beta distribution has a domain of [0, 1].16 The distribu-
tion’s two parameters, A and B, determine the variance and skew-
ness of the distribution. The benchmark distribution in this study is 
a Beta distribution with parameter values A = B = 1, which is a Uni-
form distribution. The implications of greater homogeneity among 
buyers is explored by increasing the values of the distribution pa-
rameters while maintaining A = B. Removing the A = B constraint al-
lows me to explore the implications of skewed distributions. 
 The broad range of parameters studied represents many real-life 
contracting scenarios. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the 
generality of the results is limited by the specific functional forms 
used in the numeric analysis. A different performance technology or 
a different distribution of buyer valuations will clearly affect the 
quantitative results. Still, many of the qualitative insights derived 
from the numeric analysis are robust to variations in the assumed 
functional forms. Moreover, the general framework developed in this 
Article can be used to reassess the quantitative results for alterna-
tive functional forms. 
III.   THE OPTIMAL DAMAGES CAP 
 The model developed in Part II can be used to study the character-
istics of the optimal damages cap. How do different parameters—
specifically the magnitude of communication costs—the performance 
technology, and the distribution of buyer valuations affect the opti-
mal cap? 
                                                                                                                      
 15. The numeric solutions were derived using Matlab (Version 7). 
 16. A more general version of the Beta distribution has parameters that determine 
the location and breadth of its domain. 
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A.   Communication Costs 
 The magnitude of communication costs, as captured by the k pa-
rameter, significantly affects the optimal damages cap, vˆ . Figure 3 
depicts the functional relationship between vˆ  and k, when buyer 
valuations are uniformly distributed and the performance technology 
is characterized by 5=λ . Figure 3 also depicts the threshold values, 
v1, v2, and v3, as a function of k. 
FIGURE 3 
THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION COSTS ( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
 
 Starting at the low communication costs end of the scale, the op-
timal foreseeability threshold is relatively high, at the ninetieth per-
centile of possible valuations of contractual performance. An increase 
in communication costs leads to a decline in the optimal damages 
cap. The reduced pooling price achieved by the lower cap allows more 
low-value buyers to join the pool and save on communication costs: v2 
decreases. The optimal cap falls monotonically, further increasing 
the size of the pool, and saving on communication costs.  
 It is not until communication costs reach a fairly high level—14% 
of the average buyer valuation—that the decreasing v2 graph inter-
sects with the increasing v1 graph and the four-region equilibrium 
gives way to the three-region equilibrium (not depicted in Figure 3). 
At this point there is no more communication by low-value buyers: 
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.060.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
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  0.8 
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they either join the pool or exit (the communication option is always 
dominated by at least one of these two alternatives). Switching from 
the four-region equilibrium to the three-region equilibrium generates 
a discontinuity in the level of the optimal damages cap.  
 As communication costs continue to increase, the optimal cap re-
sumes its monotonic decline. This decline lowers the pooling price 
and induces more low-value buyers to enter the market. At this stage 
communication costs are not borne by anyone. Still, higher communi-
cation costs prevent higher-value buyers from leaving the pool (even 
when the damages cap falls) and, thus, facilitate the inclusion of 
more low-value buyers through a reduced pooling price brought 
about by a lower damages cap. 
 Figure 3 highlights three results. First, the optimal damages cap 
is consistently and significantly above the average buyer valuation. 
Second, relatively small communication costs, 0.001, or 0.2% of the 
average buyer valuation (0.2% of 0.5 = 0.001), already generate sub-
stantial pooling. Specifically, 10% of buyers, those with the highest 
valuations, choose not to communicate their type. Third, even with 
relatively small communication costs, a substantial number of low-
value buyers are excluded from the market. Specifically, over 20% of 
buyers, those with the lowest valuations, withdraw from the market. 
 Not surprisingly, attainable welfare decreases as communication 
costs increase. Figure 4 plots welfare as a function of communication 
costs. 
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FIGURE 4 
WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF COMMUNICATION COSTS 
( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
 
 
 Starting from very low communication costs, an increase in com-
munication costs from 0.001, or 0.2% of the average buyer valuation, 
to 0.01, or 2% of the average buyer valuation, leads to a 5.3% reduc-
tion in welfare. The marginal effect of communication costs on wel-
fare decreases as communication costs increase. In fact, for suffi-
ciently high communication costs, specifically k = 0.05, or 10% of the 
average buyer valuation, an increase in communication costs in-
creases welfare. A possible explanation is that the high communica-
tion costs are not incurred by buyers, but rather serve to support an 
efficient pooling equilibrium that minimizes communication costs. 
B.   Performance Technology 
 Are the results stated in Part III.A robust to changes in the per-
formance technology? I begin by studying more efficient performance 
technologies. For concreteness, compare the performance technology 
studied in Part III.A, which is characterized by 5=λ , and a more ef-
ficient performance technology characterized by 10=λ . Figure 5 
replicates Figure 3 with a 10=λ  technology. 
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FIGURE 5 
THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION COSTS ( 10=λ , A = B =1) 
 
 When communication costs are k = 0.001, the optimal foreseeabil-
ity threshold given the 5=λ  technology is at the ninetieth percen-
tile of possible buyer valuations. With the more efficient 10=λ  
technology, the optimal threshold is below the ninetieth percentile. 
The more efficient technology makes pooling more attractive to high-
valuation buyers. It is thus possible to reduce the foreseeability 
threshold, increase the size of the pool, and lower communication 
costs without driving high-valuation buyers out of the pool. The size 
of the pool increases further, compared to the size of the pool with 
the 5=λ  technology, as communication costs rise. The optimal fore-
seeability threshold with a 10=λ  technology is always lower than 
the optimal threshold with a 5=λ  technology. These results are de-
picted in Figure 6. 
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FIGURE 6 
*vˆ AS A FUNCTION OF k FOR 5=λ  AND  10=λ  
 
 The more efficient performance technology also significantly re-
duces the number of low-valuation buyers who withdraw from the 
market. Specifically, for communication costs of k = 0.001 only 12% of 
all buyers withdraw from the market with the 10=λ  technology, as 
compared to over 20% of all buyers who withdraw from the market 
with the 5=λ  technology.  
 Not surprisingly, the more efficient performance technology pro-
duces higher welfare at every level of communication costs. Figure 7 
graphs welfare as a function of communication costs for both the 
5=λ  technology and the 10=λ  technology. 
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FIGURE 7 
WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF COMMUNICATION COSTS FOR 
5=λ  AND 10=λ  (A = B =1) 
 
The welfare effects are quite large: moving from a 5=λ  performance 
technology to a 10=λ  performance technology entails a welfare in-
crease of over 60%. 
 The comparison between the 5=λ  technology and the 10=λ  
technology demonstrates the impact of the performance technology 
on both the optimal foreseeability threshold and the attainable level 
of welfare. Figure 8 presents a broader comparative statics analysis. 
Figure 8(a) plots the optimal threshold as a function of the perform-
ance technology ( ∈λ [1, 50]) for k = 0.001 and k = 0.02. Figure 8(b) 
plots the maximum attainable social welfare as a function of the per-
formance technology ( ∈λ [1, 50]) for k = 0.001 and k = 0.02.  
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FIGURE 8 
THE FORESEEABILITY THRESHOLD AND  
WELFARE AS FUNCTIONS OF λ  (A = B =1) 
 
C.   Distribution of Buyer Valuations 
 Another important factor affecting the optimal damages cap is the 
distribution of buyer valuations. Recall that with heterogeneous buy-
ers, specifically with buyer valuations following a Uniform distribu-
tion, for very low communication costs the optimal threshold was ap-
proximately 0.90. And when communication costs increased, the op-
timal threshold declined monotonically.17 As buyers become more 
homogeneous, these results change. First, the initial decrease in the 
optimal threshold when communication costs increase is smaller. 
Second, after a certain level of communication costs is reached, this 
decrease is reversed, and the optimal foreseeability threshold in-
creases with communication costs. The level of communication costs 
at which this change in trajectory occurs is decreasing in the degree 
of homogeneity among buyers.  
 These results are demonstrated for a distribution of buyers char-
acterized by A = B = 5 in Figure 9. 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Only at a very high level of communication costs, k = 0.05, and at a relatively low 
foreseeability threshold, approximately 0.63, did the trajectory change and the optimal 
threshold began to increase as communication costs rose further. The reason for this 
change in trajectory was the switch from the four- to the three-region equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 9 
THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION COSTS ( 5=λ , A = B = 5) 
 
 Overall, the foreseeability thresholds are higher when the distri-
bution of buyer valuations is more homogeneous. Moreover, the abso-
lute thresholds underestimate the impact of increased homogeneity. 
With a uniform distribution of buyer valuations, a 0.9 foreseeability 
threshold implies that 90% of buyers would be fully compensated (for 
damages from breach of contract) under the default. With the more 
homogeneous A = B = 5 distribution, a 0.9 foreseeability threshold 
implies that over 99% of buyers would be fully compensated for 
breach of contract under the default. 
 What are the welfare implications of the degree of homogeneity? 
Figure 10 plots welfare as a function of communication costs for both 
A = B = 1 and A = B = 5. 
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FIGURE 10 
WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF k  
FOR A = B = 1 AND A = B = 5  ( 5=λ ) 
 
 Figure 11 presents a broader comparative statistical analysis. 
Figure 11(a) plots the optimal threshold as a function of the degree of 
homogeneity (A = B ∈[1,2,3,4,5,10]) for k = 0.001 and k = 0.02. Fig-
ure 11(b) plots the maximum attainable social welfare as a function 
of the degree of homogeneity (A = B ∈[1,2,3,4,5,10]) for k = 0.001 and 
k = 0.02.   
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FIGURE 11 
THE FORESEEABILITY THRESHOLD AND  
WELFARE AS FUNCTIONS OF A = B ( 5=λ )  
 
 The analysis thus far focused on symmetric distributions of buyer 
valuations. How would the results change with skewed distributions? 
Figure 12 begins to answer this question. It plots the optimal thresh-
old (Figure 12(a)) and social welfare (Figure 12(b)) as a function of 
the ratio A/B, where a ratio A/B < 1 represents a distribution that is 
skewed to the left and a ratio A/B > 1 represents a distribution that 
is skewed to the right. 
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FIGURE 12 
THE FORESEEABILITY THRESHOLD 
 AND WELFARE AS FUNCTIONS OF A/B ( 5=λ ) 
 
IV.   HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO OPTIMALLY SET THE FORESEEABILITY 
THRESHOLD? 
 In many contractual environments communication costs are low. 
If it is easy to opt out of the default rule, then it should not matter 
very much whether the default is set optimally.18 Part IV attempts to 
quantify this observation. Exactly how much welfare is lost when the 
default rule is not set optimally? How small must communication 
costs be to render the choice of default immaterial? 
 I begin by defining the efficiency cost of a default rule vˆ  that de-
viates from the optimal default *vˆ  as ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )*** ˆˆˆˆ;ˆ vWvWvWvvEC −= . 
Figure 13(a) plots ( )*ˆ;ˆ vvEC  for ],.[ˆ 120∈v  when 5=λ , 1== BA , and 
k = 0.005. Figure 13(b) plots ( )*ˆ;ˆ vvEC  for ],.[ˆ 120∈v  when 5=λ , 
1== BA , and 050.=k .19 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Recall the perfect competition assumption. In imperfectly competitive markets de-
fault rules can significantly affect welfare even when communication costs are very small. 
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 2. 
 19. For an explanation why the domain in Figure 13 is ],.[ˆ 120∈v , rather than 
],[ˆ 10∈v , see infra Part V (and specifically footnote 21). 
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FIGURE 13 
EFFICIENCY COST AS A FUNCTION OF vˆ  FOR  
k = 0.005 AND k = 0.05 ( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
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 To facilitate a broader comparative statistical analysis, I use a 
more specific definition of efficiency costs. I calculate ( )*ˆ.ˆ vvEC ⋅= 50  
and ( )*ˆ.ˆ vvEC ⋅= 51 , and define 
( ) ( ) ( )*** ˆ.ˆ,ˆ.ˆmaxˆ vvECvvECvEC ⋅=⋅== 5150  as the efficiency cost of 
failing to accurately set the default rule at the optimal level *vˆ . This 
definition allows me to study how the different parameters affect the 
magnitude of the efficiency cost generated by inaccurate defaults.20  
 I begin by studying the implications of communication costs. Fig-
ure 14 plots ( )*vˆEC  as a function of k. 
FIGURE 14 
EFFICIENCY COST AS A FUNCTION OF k ( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
 
 
Figure 14 answers the question how small must communication costs 
be to render the choice of default immaterial. When communication 
costs are substantial, around 10% of the average buyer valuation, the 
efficiency cost of choosing the wrong foreseeability threshold is also 
substantial; almost 10% of the maximum attainable welfare is lost. 
But even for more reasonable levels of communication costs, say 2% 
                                                                                                                      
 20. The assumption here is that the court gets the default wrong, but the parties an-
ticipate this wrong default rule ex ante. The alternative assumption that ex ante the par-
ties are uncertain about the default is discussed in Part VI infra. 
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of the average buyer valuation, the efficiency cost is nonnegligible, 
almost 1%.  
 The magnitude of the communication costs also determines the 
importance of tailoring the default to the performance technology 
and to the distribution of buyer valuations. When communication 
costs are high, such tailoring produces significant welfare gains. 
When communication costs are small, even large deviations from the 
optimally tailored default result in an insignificant welfare loss. 
V.   A ZERO-DAMAGES DEFAULT 
 The optimal foreseeability thresholds derived above were not al-
ways optimal. For some parameter values, a very different default 
rule—a zero-damages default—would produce greater welfare. In 
other words, the foreseeability thresholds studied thus far were in 
some instances only second-best optimal, namely, optimal given a 
feasibility constraint imposed on the optimization problem. The im-
posed feasibility constraint is doctrinal or even institutional in na-
ture. It posits that courts cannot set a zero-foreseeability threshold.21 
This would mean that absent a specific contractual provision to the 
contrary, there would be no liability for breach of contract.22 
 To understand the potential importance of the doctrinal con-
straint, it is useful to study the relationship between social welfare 
and the foreseeability threshold for different levels of communication 
costs. Figure 15 depicts welfare as a function of the foreseeability 
threshold for k = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6, assuming 5=λ and A 
= B = 1. 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Since the second-best optimal thresholds studied above are in some cases outper-
formed not only by the zero-damages default, but by a range of foreseeability thresholds 
between zero and 0.2, the imposed doctrinal constraint is more accurately defined as ruling 
out foreseeability thresholds below one-half of the average buyer valuation. 
 22. The posited doctrinal constraint is a corollary of the compensation principle in 
contract law. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, for a critical discussion of this principle. 
There may, however, be efficiency reasons to reject a zero-damages default, especially if de-
fault rules are sticky. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default 
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 649 (2006); Johnston, supra note 2. 
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FIGURE 15 
WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF THE FORESEEABILITY 
THRESHOLD ( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
 
 Figure 15 shows that the welfare function has two local maxima: 
one at a foreseeability threshold above the average valuation (0.5) 
and another at a foreseeability threshold of zero. The intuition for 
this bimodal distribution is as follows. A three-region equilibrium is 
obtained when the foreseeability threshold is sufficiently low (see 
Figure 2, supra). Low-valuation buyers either withdraw from the 
market or join the pool. When the foreseeability threshold ap-
proaches zero, most of the low-valuation buyers remain in the mar-
ket. Moreover, these low-valuation buyers do not incur communica-
tion costs. The reduction in communication costs incurred by low-
valuation buyers is, however, counteracted by the increased commu-
nication costs incurred by high-valuation buyers. On balance, a fore-
seeability threshold near zero produces relatively high welfare, espe-
cially when communication costs are low such that the inclusion of 
low-valuation buyers is the dominant consideration. 
 When the foreseeability threshold increases from zero, welfare ini-
tially falls as more low-value buyers exit the market. When the fore-
seeability threshold increases further, the marginal impact of the ex-
clusion effect becomes weaker, since the remaining low-value buyers 
are not easily driven out of the market by a slight increase in the 
pooling price. Now welfare increases with the foreseeability thresh-
old, as this increase economizes on communication costs. At some 
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point, the three-region equilibrium is replaced by the four-region 
equilibrium (see Figure 1, supra). Welfare continues to increase with 
the foreseeability threshold as long as the marginal communication 
costs saved by the high-valuation buyers outweigh the marginal 
communication costs incurred by the low-valuation buyers. When the 
toll on low-valuation buyers surpasses the benefit to high-valuation 
buyers, welfare starts to fall and continues to decline monotonically 
as the foreseeability threshold continues to rise. 
 Given the bimodal nature of the welfare function, when is the doc-
trinal constraint binding? When communication costs are large, the 
local maximum with a foreseeability threshold above the average 
buyer valuation is also the global maximum, and the doctrinal con-
straint is not binding. When communication costs are small, the local 
maximum with the zero-foreseeability threshold is the global maxi-
mum. Here the doctrinal constraint is binding.  
 How big are the welfare costs imposed by the doctrinal constraint? 
Figure 16 plots the welfare loss, as a percentage of the maximum 
welfare attainable, as a function of communication costs for 5=λ  
and A = B = 1. 
FIGURE 16 
WELFARE LOSS AS A FUNCTION OF k ( 5=λ , A = B = 1) 
 
 
 There is no welfare loss when communication costs exceed 0.031. 
When communication costs drop below 0.031, the doctrinal constraint 
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kicks in. The welfare loss increases monotonically as communication 
costs continue to fall. Figure 16 shows that the doctrinal constraint 
significantly affects welfare and can cause a welfare loss in excess of 
ten percent.  
 The welfare implications of the doctrinal constraint depend on the 
magnitude of the communication costs. Of particular interest is the 
cutoff level of communication costs beyond which the doctrinal con-
straint is binding. How is this cutoff level affected by changes in the 
performance technology and the distribution of buyer valuations? 
 Figure 17 depicts the cutoff level of communication costs as a 
function of the performance technology (represented by the λ  pa-
rameter). The cutoff level is monotonically decreasing in the effi-
ciency of the performance technology. The intuition for this result is 
as follows. The advantage of the zero-damages default lies in its abil-
ity to induce full separation. This, however, is also the main cost of 
the zero-damages default, since full separation entails high commu-
nication costs. When the performance technology is more efficient, 
the benefit of full separation—tailored precaution levels—is reduced. 
Accordingly, the zero-damages default remains socially desirable 
only for lower levels of communication costs.  
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FIGURE 17 
CUTOFF LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION COSTS 
 AS A FUNCTION OF λ  (A = B = 1) 
 
 
 The cutoff level of communication costs is less sensitive to changes 
in the degree of homogeneity among buyers. Still, the cutoff level de-
creases as the distribution of buyer valuations becomes more homo-
geneous. 
 The doctrinal constraint imposes significant welfare costs. Must 
we abide by this constraint? Are zero damages really unthinkable? 
Looking at the broad category of losses from breach of contract as a 
whole the answer is probably yes. But we need not look at this cate-
gory as a whole. For example, Ian Ayres has argued that lost retail 
profits should be governed by a separate default rule: a zero-damages 
default rule.23 The preceding analysis provides further support for 
this proposal. More generally, it may be desirable to break up the 
broad category of damages from breach of contract into several sub-
                                                                                                                      
 23. Ayres, supra note 10, at 891-92.  
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categories and to consider a zero-damages default for at least some of 
these categories.24 
VI.   EXTENSIONS 
 The basic model studied in this Article can be extended in several 
directions. Three such extensions are listed below. I leave the devel-
opment of these extensions for future research.  
 Stochastic Damages. The model developed and studied above as-
sumes that each buyer is fully characterized by a deterministic 
valuation, v. Generally, however, a single buyer might suffer dam-
ages of varying magnitudes when the seller fails to perform the con-
tract. The stochastic damages extension was first studied by Barry 
Adler in the standard two-type model. Stochastic damages reduce the 
incentive of high-value buyers to reveal their type. Consequently, ef-
ficient separation might not occur under a low damages cap and a 
more liberal foreseeability threshold may be warranted.25 The con-
tinuous-type model developed in this Article can be extended to allow 
for stochastic damages. The effects of different distributions of dam-
ages levels could then be explored.  
 Uncertainty Regarding the Foreseeability Threshold. The preced-
ing analysis assumed that contracting parties know with certainty 
what the law is, namely, at what level the court will set the foresee-
ability threshold vˆ . But even if courts try to optimally set the dam-
ages cap, they will inevitably err, producing uncertainty about the 
default rule. The proposed model can be extended to account for such 
uncertainty, at the contracting stage, about the applicable foresee-
ability threshold.26 
 Foreseeability in Tort Law. Foreseeability of damages is important 
also in tort law. Like contract law, tort law imposes a limit on the 
ability of a victim to recover in damages.27 Focusing on interactions 
                                                                                                                      
 24. The “consequential damages” category—the object of the foreseeability limitation—
may be one category where a zero-damages default could be applied. See supra note 10. 
 25. Adler, supra note 2. 
 26. Uncertainty about the legal rule is important also within the confines of the two-
type model. In the two-type model, limited liability is assumed to allow for full recovery by 
the low-valuation type and only partial recovery by the high-valuation type. This assump-
tion implies that hl vvv ≤≤ ˆ , where lv  and hv  represent the low and high valuations, re-
spectively. If the level of uncertainty, ε , is sufficiently small, such that 
hl vvvv ≤+≤−≤ εε ˆˆ , then such uncertainty will not affect the parties’ equilibrium behav-
ior. But if uncertainty is larger or if vˆ  is closer to either lv  or hv , then uncertainty about 
the legal rule will affect the results in the two-type model. 
 27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 2001); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 644, 662-63 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
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among strangers, the classic tort scenario can be described as a spe-
cial, polar case within the contracts framework developed in this Ar-
ticle—the case of prohibitively high communication costs. Accord-
ingly, the proposed model can be readily used to calculate the opti-
mal cap on tort damages. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 I conclude with a reality check. There are two main challenges. 
The first concerns the institutional limits of common law adjudica-
tion. The preceding analysis shows how different parameters, specifi-
cally the magnitude of communication costs, the performance tech-
nology, and the distribution of buyer valuations, affect the optimal 
foreseeability threshold. Clearly courts do not estimate the magni-
tudes of the parameters identified in the theoretical model, and 
courts obviously do not apply a numeric algorithm to solve for the op-
timal damages cap before they decide whether to allow recovery in a 
specific case. Moreover, it is probably unwise to ask courts to engage 
in such an exercise. 
 Nevertheless, it is useful when evaluating the foreseeability doc-
trine to have a better understanding of the theoretical optimum. 
Consider, for example, the result that the optimal damages cap is 
significantly above average damages. At first blush, this result runs 
contrary to common doctrinal statements that “foreseeable” damages 
are average damages. On deeper reflection, however, these “average 
damages” statements hide a powerful tendency to narrowly apply the 
foreseeability requirement28—a tendency that sits well with the theo-
retical result.  
 The optimality of a zero-damages default when communication 
costs are sufficiently small is another result that seems inconsistent 
with contract doctrine and especially with the dominance of the com-
pensation principle. This result can be interpreted as reinforcing re-
cent challenges to the compensation principle.29 Viewed differently, 
this result may suggest that opting out of the default rule is not as 
easy as it seems. While communication costs narrowly defined are 
most likely small, there may be other factors contributing to the 
stickiness of default rules.30 And if the default is sticky, then a zero-
damages default becomes less attractive. 
 Even apart from its potential value for understanding or criticiz-
ing contract doctrine, the analysis in this Article can be useful for 
private contracting parties. Private parties have better information 
                                                                                                                      
 28. See, e.g., 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 259. 
 29. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 9. 
 30. See sources cited supra note 22. 
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than courts. They also have powerful incentives to optimally design 
their contracts. 
 The second challenge to the relevance of the preceding analysis 
returns to the argument that communication costs are trivial, and 
thus the default rule does not matter. This is a powerful challenge.31 
A main purpose of this Article was to define the contours of the trivi-
ality argument by quantifying the magnitude of communication costs 
necessary to render the default rule relevant. Even when communi-
cation costs are narrowly defined, as in this Article, there is a class of 
cases where getting the default right is of nontrivial importance. This 
class of cases will likely grow when broader costs of opting out of a 
default rule are considered. 
                                                                                                                      
 31. In fact, it is a challenge to much of the default rules literature. 
